Abstract-We address the question whether quantum memory is more powerful than classical memory. In particular, we consider a setting where information about a random -bit string is stored in classical or quantum bits, for , i.e., the stored information is bound to be only partial. Later, a randomly chosen predicate about has to be guessed using only the stored information. The maximum probability of correctly guessing ( ) is then compared for the cases where the storage device is classical or quantum mechanical, respectively. We show that, despite the fact that the measurement of quantum bits can depend arbitrarily on the predicate , the quantum advantage is negligible already for small values of the difference . Our setting generalizes the setting of Ambainis et al. who considered the problem of guessing an arbitrary bit (i.e., one of the bits) of .
I. INTRODUCTION

I
T is a well-known fact that in quantum bits one cannot reliably store more than classical bits of information. 1 In other words, the raw storage capacity (like the raw transmission capacity) of a quantum bit is just one bit of information. However, since quantum memory can be read by an arbitrary measurement determined only at the time of reading the memory, quantum memory can be expected to be more powerful than classical memory in any context where a string of bits of information is given (and hence can be stored only partially) and it is determined only later which information about is of interest. 2 The simplest setting one can consider is that one must use the stored information to guess for a randomly chosen 1 This is a direct consequence of the Holevo bound [1] stating that the accessible information contained in a quantum state cannot be larger than its von Neumann entropy. This assertion is also a consequence of the general results proven in this paper (cf. Section IV-C). 2 A typical example of such a setting is the bounded-storage model [2] , [3] .
predicate . Ambainis, Nayak, Ta-Shma, and Vazirani [4] , [5] were the first to study such a setting for the special case where is an -bit string and is an actual bit (i.e., one of the bits) of . Because in the quantum case one can let the measurement of the stored quantum bits depend arbitrarily on , while in the classical case one can only read the stored information, quantum memory is potentially more powerful. However, we prove that having information about stored in quantum instead of classical bits is essentially useless for guessing , even for optimal quantum storage and measurement strategies. This is in accordance with the results in [4] , [5] as well as with recent results on communication complexity (see, e.g., [6] ) where the power of classical and quantum communication is compared.
In a cryptographic context, our results can be applied to the security analysis of cryptographic primitives in a context where an adversary might hold quantum information. An important example is privacy amplification introduced by Bennett, Brassard, and Robert [7] (see also [8] ) which is a protocol between two parties, Alice and Bob. The goal is to turn a common -bit string , about which an adversary Eve has some partial information, into a highly secure -bit key . This can be achieved as follows: Alice and Bob publicly agree on a function chosen from a two-universal class of hash functions 3 and then compute . 4 It has been shown that, if Eve's information about consists of no more than classical bits, the final key is secure as long as . 5 Similar to the previously described setting, it seems to be a potential advantage for the adversary to have available quantum instead of classical bits of information about because she later learns the function and can let her measurement of the quantum bits depend on . This may allow her to obtain more information about the final key . We prove that this is not the case, i.e., privacy amplification remains equally secure against adversaries holding quantum information.
This has interesting implications for quantum key distribution (QKD): In a QKD protocol, Alice and Bob first exchange quantum information (e.g., polarized photons) to generate a raw key which is only partially secure, i.e., Eve has some quantum information about . In a second (purely classical) phase, Alice and Bob apply privacy amplification to generate the final secret key . Our result on the security of privacy amplification thus reduces the problem of proving the security of a QKD protocol to the problem of finding a bound on the number of qubits needed to (reliably) store Eve's information . In [10] , this fact has been exploited to show the security of a generic QKD protocol which, in particular, implies the security of many known protocols such as BB84 [11] . This simplifies and generalizes 6 known security proofs (see, e.g., [12] ) which are based on completely different techniques. It also generalizes a proof by Ben-Or [13] which is based on a similar idea using results from communication complexity theory [14] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section III, we introduce a general framework for modeling and quantifying knowledge and storage devices. The framework is then used in Section IV to state and prove bounds on the success probability when guessing a binary predicate of given information about stored in a quantum storage device (Section IV-B). These are then compared to the situation where the information about is purely classical (Section IV-C). In Section V, the results are extended to nonbinary functions which then allows for proving the security of privacy amplification against quantum adversaries (Section V-B).
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Let be the set of functions with domain and range . The set of binary functions with domain , in the following called predicates on , is denoted as . Similarly is the set of balanced predicates on . Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters (e.g., ), their range by corresponding calligraphic letters ( ), and the values they take on by lower case letters ( ). The event that two random variables and take on the same value is denoted as . In contrast, we write if two random variables and are identical (i.e., if always holds). The expectation of a function on the random variable is given by . For a channel from to and a random variable on , we denote by the output of on input , i.e., if the channel is defined by the conditional distributions for , the joint probability distribution of and is given by for all . A random function from to is a random variable taking values from the set of functions mapping elements from to . The set of random functions from to is denoted as . If is uniformly distributed over , it is called a uniform random function from to . Similarly, a (uniform) random predicate on is a random function with (uniform) distribution over the set , and a (uniform) balanced random predicate is (uniformly) distributed over the set . In the sequel, we will only use random functions which are independent of all other (previously defined) random variables.
A random function from to is called 7 two-universal if holds for any distinct 6 Most known security proofs are restricted to one specific QKD protocol. 7 In the literature, two-universality is usually defined for families G of functions: A family G is called two-universal if the random function G with uniform distribution over G is two-universal. For our purposes, however, our more general definition is more convenient.
. In particular, is two-universal if, for any distinct , the random variables and are independent and uniformly distributed. For instance, a uniform random function from to is two-universal. Nontrivial examples where the distribution of is over a smaller set of function (thus requiring less randomness) can, e.g., be found in [15] and [16] .
B. Distance From Uniform
The variational distance between two distributions and over an alphabet is defined as
The variational distance of a distribution from the uniform distribution (over the same alphabet ) is of particular interest in cryptographic applications. We will use the abbreviation for this quantity and refer to it as the distance of from uniform. For the distance of the distribution of a random variable from uniform, we also write instead of , and, more generally, for any event ,
. Note that is a convex function, i.e., for two probability distributions and , and with , we have . The distance of a random variable from uniform has a natural interpretation: It equals the probability that deviates from a uniformly distributed random variable , in the following sense.
Lemma 1: For any probability distribution on there exists a channel such that is the uniform distribution on and .
For two random variables and , the (expected) distance of from uniform given is defined (cf. [2] ) as the expectation of the distance of from uniform conditioned on , i.e., It follows directly from the convexity of that , and, more generally, for an additional random variable and an event , .
III. MODELING KNOWLEDGE AND STORAGE
A. Knowledge and Guessing
Let be a random variable and let be an entity with knowledge described by a random variable (jointly distributed with according to some distribution ). Intuitively, one would say that knows nothing about if is uniformly distributed given 's knowledge , i.e., where is the uniform distribution. The following straightforward generalization of Lemma 1 suggests that the distance of from uniform given can be interpreted as the probability of deviating from this situation.
Lemma 2:
For any probability distribution on there exists a channel such that is the uniform distribution on , , and This is of particular interest in cryptography, where, for instance, is an adversary with knowledge and where one wants to use as a key. Typically, a cryptosystem based on a key is secure when is uniformly distributed and independent of 's knowledge. The lemma implies that, with probability , is equal to such a perfect key . This means that any statement which is true for an ideal setting where is used as a key automatically holds, with probability at least , for a real setting where is the key. The distance from uniform is also a measure for the maximum success probability of an entity knowing when trying to guess where the maximum is over all channels from to . 8 The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the simple fact that the best strategy for guessing given is to choose a value maximizing the probability .
Lemma 3:
Let and be random variables. Then where equality holds if is binary.
B. Selectable Knowledge
The characterization of knowledge about a random variable held by an entity in terms of a random variable is sufficient whenever this knowledge is fully accessible, e.g., written down on a sheet of paper or stored in a classical storage device. However, in a more general context, might have an option as to which information she can obtain. For example, if her information about is encoded into the state of a quantum system, she may select one arbitrary measurement to "read it out." Formally, every measurement corresponds to a channel from the state space of the quantum system to the set of possible measurement outcomes. The situation is thus completely characterized by the set of measurements (that is, channels) and the joint distribution of and . This setting is discussed in detail in Section III-D. Another (more artificial) example might be a storage unit which can hold two bits , but which allows only to read out one of these bits, i.e., can read either the value or . In this case, the situation is described by the joint distribution of and and the set of channels , where channel maps to for . To model these situations, it is useful to introduce the following notion.
Definition 4: A selectable channel
on with range is a set of channels from to .
Consider now a setting as described above, i.e., there is a system which is in a state described by a random variable on , and an entity has access to by means of a channel from a set . In the following, we say that an entity has selectable knowledge , meaning that can learn the value of exactly one arbitrarily chosen random variable with . The knowledge of about a random variable can then be quantified by a natural generalization of the distance measure introduced above. 8 Recall that C denotes the output of the channel C on input W .
Definition 5:
Let and be random variables and let be a selectable channel on the range of . The distance of from uniform given is
The significance of this generalized definition of distance from uniform, e.g., in cryptography, is implied by a straightforward extension of Lemma 2.
Lemma 6: Let and be random variables and let be a selectable channel on the range of . Then for any choice of an element of there exists a random variable defined by a channel , such that is the uniform distribution on and Similarly, Lemma 3 can be generalized to obtain a bound for the maximum success probability of an entity with selectable knowledge when guessing
Lemma 7: Let and be random variables and let be a selectable channel on the range of . Then where equality holds if is binary.
Consider now a situation where the information about of an entity is described by both some selectable knowledge and, additionally, a random variable which she can use to choose an element from . More precisely, she applies some channel from to to the random variable and then chooses to learn for the resulting . We will then be interested in the maximal distance of from uniform resulting from an optimal strategy used by . Such an optimal strategy consists simply of (deterministically) choosing some which maximizes , given . We thus introduce the following quantity.
Definition 8: Let , , and be random variables and let be a selectable channel on the range of . The distance of from uniform given and is defined as
It is easy to see that for some selectable channel on which models the fact that can choose an arbitrary strategy. In particular, Lemmas 6 and 7 still hold when is replaced by , where is defined as the maximal probability of when guessing in the situation described above.
It is a direct consequence of the properties of the variational distance that knowledge of an additional random variable can only increase the distance from uniform given selectable knowledge.
Lemma 9: Let , , and be random variables and let be a selectable channel on the domain of . Then
C. Storage Devices
A (physical) storage device is a physical system where the information it contains is determined by its physical state . Information is stored in the device by choosing a state from its state space . A storage device might provide different mechanisms to read out this information, each of them resulting in some (generally only partial) information about its state . However, any possible strategy of accessing the stored information can be described as a channel mapping the memory state to a random variable . We thus define a storage device with state space and range as a selectable channel from to . As an example, consider the (artificial) storage device previously mentioned which allows to store two bits, but where only one of them can be read out. Formally, this storage device is a selectable channel from the state space to the set where is the channel mapping to , for . The most trivial case is a classical storage device for storing bits and allowing to read out all bits without errors. Obviously, its state can take one of possible values. Moreover, any accessing strategy corresponds to a channel with input . Formally, a classical -bit storage device is defined as the selectable channel containing all channels taking inputs from the set . (In Section III-D, we will give an analogous definition for quantum storage devices.) Note that for a random variable and a random variable on , . Thus, we omit to mention the selectable channel if it is clear from the context, e.g., we write instead of .
D. Quantum Storage
An -qubit storage device is a quantum system of dimension where information is stored by encoding it into the state of the system. This information can (partially) be read out by measuring the system's state with respect to some (arbitrarily chosen) measurement basis. Each pure state of a -dimensional quantum system corresponds to a normalized vector in a -dimensional Hilbert space . Equivalently, the set of pure states can be identified with the set where is the projection operator in along the vector . The set of all possible states of the quantum system is then given by the set of mixed states , which is the convex hull of . It is well known from quantum information theory that the most general strategy to access the information contained in a quantum system is to perform a positive operator-valued measurement (POVM), which gives a classical measurement outcome . Any possible measurement is specified by a family of nonnegative operators on satisfying . If the system is in state , the probability of obtaining the (classical) measurement outcome when applying measurement is given by . In the framework presented in the previous section, a -dimensional quantum storage device is thus defined as the set of channels describing all possible POVMs on a -dimensional quantum state, i.e., POVM A general way of describing this setting is to define the state of the storage device by a family of quantum states , where is the conditional state of the system given , that is, . Similar to the notation introduced for classical storage devices , we will also write instead of . According to Definition 5, the distance of a random variable from uniform given can be written as where the maximum is taken over all POVMs and where is the measurement outcome of applied to the quantum state, i.e.,
. Similarly, for an additional random variable where, for each , is a POVM and where is defined by .
IV. QUANTUM KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PREDICATES
A. The Quantum Binary Decision Problem
We begin this section by stating a few known results about the so-called quantum binary decision problem, which are central to the proof of our main statements concerning quantum knowledge.
Let be arbitrary (mixed) states of a quantummechanical system , and suppose that the system is prepared either in the state or in with a priori probabilities and , respectively. The quantum binary decision problem is the problem of deciding between these two possibilities by an appropriate measurement. Any decision strategy can be summarized by a binary-valued POVM , where the hypothesis is chosen whenever the outcome is . For a fixed strategy , the probability of choosing , when the actual state is , is given by , . Thus, the expected probability of success for this strategy equals
The maximum achievable expected success probability in the binary decision problem is the quantity
The following theorem is due to Helstrom [17] . We state it using the notation of Fuchs [18] who also gave a simple proof of it.
Theorem 10: Let be two states, let , and let be the eigenvalues of the Hermitian operator . Then, the maximum achievable expected success probability in the quantum binary decision problem is
B. Bounds on Quantum Knowledge
Let be a random variable and let be a randomly chosen predicate on . The goal of this subsection is to derive a bound on the distance of from uniform given knowledge about stored in a quantum storage device. Such knowledge is modeled by a family of quantum states , where is the state of the quantum system conditioned on the event that . An explicit expression for the corresponding quantity can be obtained using a result on the quantum binary decision problem (cf. Section IV-A). 
for every . Let thus be fixed and assume for simplicity that and (otherwise, (2) is trivially satisfied).
Let . Conditioned on the event that , the state equals with probability . This situation can equivalently be described by saying that the system is in the mixed state , where
The problem of guessing thus corresponds exactly to the quantum binary decision problem described in Section IV-A, i.e., where the second equality follows from Theorem 10. Finally, since is binary, (2) follows from Lemma 7.
The expression for the distance of from uniform provided by Lemma 11 is generally difficult to evaluate. The following theorem gives a much simpler upper bound for this quantity. 9 Theorem 12: Let be a random variable with range and let be a random predicate on . Let further be a family of states on a -dimensional Hilbert space. Then where , for . Proof: We set out from the equation provided by Lemma 11. Note that, for any where the inequality is Jensen's inequality (applied to the convex mapping ) and where the equality is a consequence of Schur's (in)equality (cf. Lemma 20) , which can be applied because is Hermitian and thus also normal. We conclude that (3) where Jensen's inequality is applied once again.
By the definition of in Lemma 11, we have where is the Kronecker delta. 10 The assertion then follows by taking the expectation of this expression over and combining the result with (3).
If is two-universal, the quantity on the right-hand side of Theorem 12 can be bounded by an expression which is independent of the particular storage function.
Corollary 13:
Let be a random variable with range and let be a two-universal random predicate on . Then, for every family of states on a -dimensional Hilbert space Proof: Since is two-universal, the values (as defined in Theorem 12) cannot be positive for any distinct . Since , we conclude that for . Moreover, and , for any . Combining these facts, the assertion follows directly from the upper bound given by Theorem 12.
Note that the expression under the square root is simply the collision probability of . Hence, with the Rényi entropy , the above inequality can be rewritten as (4) where is the number of qubits in which is stored, i.e., .
C. Comparing Classical and Quantum Storage Devices
Since orthogonal states of a quantum system can always be perfectly distinguished, a random variable can always be stored and perfectly retrieved in a quantum storage device of dimension as long as the size of the range of does not exceed . Hence, a classical -bit storage device cannot be more powerful than a storage device consisting of qubits. Formally, this can be stated as follows. For any random variables and on and , respectively, there is a family of states such that for any (5) The following lemma shows that, on the other hand, a quantum storage device can indeed be more useful than a corresponding classical storage device. However, we will see later that this is only true for special cases, e.g., if the difference between the number of bits to be stored and the capacity of the storage device is small. ). The assertion then follows from a straightforward calculation.
Together with Lemma 7, Lemma 14 implies that the maximum probability of correctly guessing a randomly chosen balanced predicate about a random 2-bit string is larger if information about can be stored in one qubit ( ) than if this information is stored in one classical bit ( ). Note that this is in accordance with earlier results showing that one individual qubit can be stronger than one classical bit (see, e.g., [4] ).
Surprisingly, this advantage of a quantum storage device becomes negligible if the difference between the length of the bitstring and the number of bits per qubits of the storage device becomes large. To see this, let us first state a lower bound for the distance of from uniform given the knowledge stored in a classical storage device. (4) and (5), we conclude that the distance from uniform has the same asymptotic behavior for the classical and the quantum case: The knowledge about the predicate decreases exponentially in the difference between the length of the bitstring and the size of the storage device.
More precisely, since, for it follows from Lemma 15 and (4) that there exists a random variable on defined by a channel such that for any family of states . This means that storing information about in classical bits instead of quantum bits allows to predict with a lower error probability.
V. FROM THE BINARY TO THE NONBINARY CASE
A. Relations Between Bounds on Knowledge
We start with a lemma bounding the distance of a random variable from uniform by the distance of a binary hash value from uniform where is a randomly chosen balanced predicate. This is related to the Vazirani XOR lemma (see, e.g., [19] ), which gives a similar bound for the case where is chosen randomly from the set of all linear functions. 11 Lemma 16 (Hashing Lemma): Let be a random variable with range and let be a uniform balanced random predicate on . Then
Proof: For any probability distribution over and any , let be the distance between the 11 The following version of Vazirani's XOR lemma is proved in [20] :
where P is the uniform distribution on the set of all nonzero linear functions from X to f0; 1g.
uniform distribution and the distribution of where is a random variable distributed according to . We have to show that (7) for any distribution over . Defining the coefficients and the sets and we obtain (8) and, for any and (9) respectively. Note that, since is convex, is convex as well and thus so is its expected value (i.e., the function defined by ). Let us first show that inequality (7) holds for distributions over where the probabilities only take two possible values, , i.e., there exist and such that for and for . Then the value in (9) only depends on the number of values for which . To get some intuition, consider the case where . Since is randomly chosen, the expected deviation of from its average value is proportional to . Furthermore, is proportional to this deviation and , and is proportional to and inverse proportional to . Neglecting the constants, this already shows that (7) holds in this particular case.
Proving the exact statement (7) requires a little bit more computation. For any predicate , expression (9) Consequently, for , inequality (7) is equivalent to
Since the term in the sum over only depends on , the sum can be replaced by a sum over , i.e., we have to show that (10) with The term has different analytic solutions depending on whether is even or odd. Let us first assume that is even. Replacing the summation index by and making use of the symmetry of the resulting terms with respect to the sign of , we get where the second equality follows from (15) of Lemma 22 with and . A straightforward calculation then shows that for fixed , the minimum of the left-hand side of the inequality in (10) is taken for as close as possible to , i.e., and , that is, Lemma 23 is then used to derive a lower bound for the term on the right-hand side of this inequality, leading to where the last inequality holds for . Similarly, for odd, applying (16) of Lemma 22 with and leads to resulting in the same lower bound for the left-hand side of the inequality in (10) for . Moreover, an explicit calculation shows that (10) also holds for , , and which concludes the proof of inequality (7) for with . Let now be an arbitrary distribution on and let be the set of permutations on with invariant sets and , i.e., and , for . Since for , we find that is a probability distribution satisfying and taking identical probabilities for all elements in as well as for all elements in , i.e., . Since inequality (7) is already proven for distributions of this form, we conclude where the second inequality is a consequence of the convexity of . Assertion (7) then follows from , for all , , and the fact that is a uniform balanced random predicate, i.e.,
In order to apply the hashing lemma to generalize the results of the previous section to the nonbinary case, we need a relation between binary random functions (i.e., random predicates) and nonbinary random functions.
Lemma 17: Let be a two-universal random function from to and let be a uniform balanced random predicate on . Then the random predicate is two-universal.
Proof: For any distinct
Note that is the collision probability of the uniform balanced random predicate , (for distinct ), which can easily be computed Since is two-universal, i.e.,
, we have i.e., the random predicate is two-universal.
Combining Lemmas 16 and 17 leads to a relation between the distance from uniform of the outcomes of binary and general (nonbinary) two-universal functions on a random variable , given some knowledge . 12 Theorem 18: Let and be random variables on and , respectively, and let be a selectable channel on . If, for all two-universal random predicates on (11) then, for all two-universal random functions from to (12) Proof: From definition (1), we have
The expression in the maximum can then be bounded using Lemma 16 , that is,
This leads to
Defining
, we obtain Finally, Lemma 17 states that is a two-universal random predicate on , hence the assertion of the theorem follows.
B. Application: Privacy Amplification With a Quantum Adversary
Consider two parties, Alice and Bob, being connected by an authentic but otherwise completely insecure communication channel. Assume that they initially share a uniformly distributed -bit key about which an adversary Eve has some partial information, where the only bound known on Eve's information is that it consists of no more than bits. Privacy amplification, introduced by Bennett, Brassard, and Robert [7] is a method to transform into an almost perfectly secure key . It has been shown that if Alice and Bob publicly (by communication over the insecure channel) choose a two-universal random function mapping the -bit string to an -bit string , for smaller than , then the resulting string is secure (i.e., Eve has virtually no information about ). Note that is roughly Eve's entropy about the initial string , i.e., privacy amplification with two-universal random functions is asymptotically optimal with respect to the number of extractable key bits. 12 Using the version of Vazirani's XOR lemma stated in Footnote 11, the constant in the bound (12) of Theorem 18 can be eliminated by replacing condition (11) by the stronger requirement
In our formalism, the possibility of privacy amplification by applying a (two-universal) random function , as proved in [7] (a simplified proof has been given in [8] ), reads (13) for any random variable on defined by a channel . Combining the results from the previous section, we obtain a similar statement for the situation where Eve's knowledge about is stored in quantum instead of classical bits. More precisely, we can derive a bound on the distance of the final key from uniform, from an adversary's point of view, where is a two-universal random function applied to an initial string , assuming only that the adversary's knowledge about is stored in a limited number of qubits. 13 Corollary 19: Let be a random variable with range and Rényi entropy and let be a two-universal random function from to . Then, for any family of states Proof: Theorem 18 together with Corollary 13 implies for any family of states . The corollary then follows from the definition of the Rényi entropy (cf. remark after the proof of Corollary 13).
We thus have a quantum analog to (13) , implying that privacy amplification remains equally secure (with the same parameters) if an adversary has quantum rather than only classical bits to store her information. Note that a similar bound follows from [13] together with a result of [5] , for the case where is the inner product with a randomly chosen string.
This generalization of the security proof of privacy amplification immediately extends a result by Csiszár and Körner [21] (see also [22] ) to the quantum case. Consider a situation where Alice and Bob share information described by independent realizations of random variables and , respectively, and where Eve has information described by realizations of a classical random variable . The result of [21] says that the number of secret key bits that can be generated by one-way communication (from Alice to Bob) over a public channel is at least (roughly)
, for large . The protocol that Alice and Bob have to apply consists of an error-correction step followed by a privacy-amplification step using a two-universal random function. If we now consider a situation where Eve holds qubits of quantum information about , it follows immediately from Corollary 19 that the same protocol can be used to generate a secret key of length roughly . 13 Note that this is an example illustrating the fact that a bound on the expected distance of a single bit H(X) from uniform d(H(X)jW W W ; H) suffices to derive bounds on the expected distance from uniform d(G(X)jW W W ; G) of a long key G(X) obtained by privacy amplification. In the case of quantum knowledge, however, it is possible to prove even stronger statements for the single-bit case, resulting in a strengthened version of Corollary 13, which gives a bound on a quantity similar to d(H(X)jW W W ; H). Using this and Footnote 12, the constant in Corollary 19 can be replaced by .
In most QKD protocols, Alice encodes some classical information into the state of a quantum system and sends it to Bob. Upon receiving this state, Bob applies a measurement, resulting in classical information . After this step, the adversary might hold some quantum information about and . The situation is thus characterized by classical random variables and together with the quantum system of Eve, where the size of her system depends on the error rate tolerated by the protocol (see [10] ). Hence, the generalization of the Csiszár-Körner bound described above directly gives an expression for the amount of key that can be generated by the protocol. In particular, it proves that the security holds against any type of attack (including coherent measurements on Eve's whole quantum system).
VI. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
It is a fundamental question whether quantum bits are more powerful than classical bits in order to store information about an -bit value (for ). We considered the problem of answering a randomly chosen question about , given only the stored information about . The uncertainty about the answer is then a measure for the usefulness of the stored information. It can be quantified in terms of the distance of from uniform conditioned on the stored information, which, for binary questions , corresponds to the advantage over of the success probability when guessing . It turns out that when storing a bitstring of length bits, one quantum bit can indeed be more useful than one classical bit (cf. Lemma 14) . However, for larger values of , the difference between classical and quantum memory becomes inessential. 14 We have shown that this has interesting implications for cryptography. In particular, privacy amplification by two-universal hashing remains secure even against adversaries holding quantum information (cf. Corollary 19) . This also leads to conceptually simpler and more general security proofs for QKD, where privacy amplification is used for the classical postprocessing of the raw key (cf. [10] , [13] ).
It is well known that so-called strong extractors [9] can be used to do privacy amplification in the classical case. While two-universal hashing can be seen as special case of this, the converse generally does not hold. It is an open problem whether strong extractors are sufficient to generate a key which is secure against a quantum adversary in general.
APPENDIX
Lemma 20 (Schur's Inequality): Let be a linear operator on a -dimensional Hilbert space and let be its eigenvalues. Then with equality if and only if is normal (i.e., ). Proof: See, e.g., [23] . 14 As shown in Section IV-C, s classical bits can be more useful than s 0 1 quantum bits. 
Proof: The first equality follows from a straightforward calculation, using the identity . The second and the third equality can be obtained with Zeilberger's algorithm [24] which is implemented in many standard computer algebra systems (e.g., Mathematica or Maple).
Lemma 23 (Stirling's Approximation): For
Proof: A proof of this extension of Stirling's approximation can be found in [25] .
